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Abstract 
One American welfare doctrine that refuses to die embarrasses the American optimist-modernist credo 
that time always brings progress. That doctrine, most recently resurrected in President Clinton's welfare 
reform legislation, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 
(PRWORA), permits states to impose what euphemistic bureaucrats call a "durational residency 
requirement" on impoverished citizens seeking government assistance to provide food, clothing, and 
shelter for their families. Where this rule once meant that impoverished citizens could be denied all 
welfare benefits for up to a year after they moved to a new state, in its current less draconian form, the 
PWRORA residency rule permits an individual state to provide the lesser of either its own minimum 
benefit or the benefit from the newcomer's state of origin for a year. However, this apparently kinder and 
gentler doctrine has ominous consequences for real people: for example, Edwin and Maria Delores 
Maldonado, who moved from Puerto Rico received $ 304 per month (the benefit level in Puerto Rico) 
when they arrived at their new home in Pennsylvania, instead of the $ 836 per month that Pennsylvania's 
long-term needy residents were getting to meet their subsistence needs. Similarly in Roe v. Anderson, a 
case argued in the United States Supreme Court in early 1999, the lower federal court noted that a family 
of four moving from Mississippi, where $ 144 would provide a subsistence living, would be hard-pressed 
to survive on that amount in Los Angeles, where the highest housing costs help push the minimum 
subsistence level for that family to $ 673 a month. 
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One American welfare doctrine that refuses to die embarrasses the American optimist-modernist credo 
that time always brings progress. That doctrine, most recently resurrected in President Clinton's welfare 
reform legislation, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 
(PRWORA),1 permits states to impose what euphemistic bureaucrats call a "durational residency 
requirement" on impoverished citizens seeking government assistance to provide food, clothing, and 
shelter for their families. Where this rule once meant that impoverished citizens could be denied all 
welfare benefits for up to a year after they moved to a new state,2 in its current less draconian form, the 
PWRORA residency rule permits an individual state to provide the lesser of either its own minimum 
benefit or the benefit from the newcomer's state of origin for a year. However, this apparently kinder 
and gentler doctrine has ominous consequences for real people: for example, Edwin and Maria Delores 
Maldonado, who moved from Puerto Rico received $ 304 per month (the benefit level in Puerto Rico) 
when they arrived at their new home in Pennsylvania, instead of the $ 836 per month that 
Pennsylvania's long-term needy residents were getting to meet their subsistence needs.3 Similarly in 
Roe v. Anderson, a case argued in the United States Supreme Court in early 1999, the lower federal 
court noted that a family of four moving from Mississippi, where $ 144 would provide a subsistence 
living, would be hard-pressed to survive on that amount in Los Angeles, where the highest housing 
costs help push the minimum subsistence level for that family to $ 673 a month.4 
 
These durational residency rules, which can be traced back to European poor relief laws, may surprise 
those used to thinking of the United States as a nation of unity in diversity, and individual opportunity 
through mobility. Indeed, they run counter to twentieth century trends eradicating most other legal and 
socio-economic barriers to movement between states.5 In the United States, workers are commonly 
transferred by their employers from one end of the country to another as job advancements open up; 
children of divorced parents regularly fly from one state to another for parental visits; and residents 
cross state borders to work, attend sporting events, and even to buy cigarettes, clothes and liquor to 
avoid higher taxes in their home state. It would not occur to an average American citizen that he or she 
could be legally prevented or discouraged from traveling through, or moving to, another state. Indeed, 
most poverty advocates had thought that rules discouraging indigents from moving from state to state 
were permanently dead after the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Shapiro v. Thompson that these rules 
violate citizens' federal right to travel or migrate from place to place,6 even though states occasionally 
would try to reinstate them after Shapiro. In fact, the Shapiro case has been a cornerstone of the 
Court's holdings in many areas that new state citizens cannot be treated differently than long-time 
residents on similar issues. Yet, the residency rule has risen from the dead: more than fifteen states 
reinstituted residency rules since Congress authorized them to do so in PRWORA, arguing that the 
Shapiro rule does not apply because they are not completely refusing benefits to newcomers, just 
reducing them.7 
 
In a nation that takes pride in its escape from tradition, the durational residency rules seem particularly 
anomalous because they can be so directly traced to ancient (by American standards) fourteenth and 
fifteenth century poor laws in England and Europe that permitted local communities to send away 
strangers in need.8 Yet, the current residency rules are not easily explained as a response to the 
economic upheaval, as their progenitors were: modern Americans see nothing like the human turmoil 
following the mass economic dislocations of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, when the poor 
marched in the streets and begged aggressively, even maiming themselves and their children to gain 
sympathy.9 Nor can the contemporary trend towards 'devolution', the return of welfare program design 
to the states,10 entirely explain the states' desire to keep strangers out. In a society that still identifies 
itself as Christian in some sense, this lingering doctrine also seems to fly in the face of clear, consistent 
Biblical demands for hospitality and succour for the stranger (Keifert 1992: 59-73).11 
 
I would suggest that residency requirements cannot be fully explained by socio-economic practicalities: 
they betray what are thought to be American expectations and values more than they support such 
values. Instead, these residency requirements are symptoms of a more deep-seated, timeless human 
fear and dislike of the stranger, the Other; and it is only by awakening lawmakers to the ethical 
encounter with the Other that these fears can be faced. 
 
I propose to consider the nature of this fear through the metaphor of the masks of the law, utilizing the 
work of U.S. federal Judge (and former law professor) John T. Noonan, Jewish philosopher Emmanuel 
Levinas, and German theologian Martin Luther. Though Noonan and Levinas insightfully accuse us of 
masking the human face, the fear we are probing requires that we attend to Luther's description of 
God's hiddenness through the metaphor of the mask to fully understand why local communities persist, 
generation after generation, in banning the needy stranger from their midst. 
 
 
Noonan and Levinas on Masking the Neighbour 
  
In Persons and Masks of the Law, Judge John T. Noonan took to task some of America's most 
respected judges and legal philosophers, including Oliver Wendell Holmes, for personifying the law, 
imagining it as an autonomous entity "which acted by the very necessity of its nature to transform moral 
standards into external or objective ones" (Noonan 1976: 3). Thus personified, Noonan argued, the law 
was made morally independent and unbeholden to any living person; permitting Thomas Jefferson and 
George Wythe, for example, to discuss slaves as property without feeling any moral need to recognize 
their humanity (Noonan 1976: 55-61.). Noonan argued that the law, objectified and separated from 
human law-makers in this fashion, became a mask over the face of human beings. That is, in the 
positivist, objective conception of law, persons are classified "so that their humanity is hidden and 
disavowed", and they are known only by their masks (Noonan 1976: 19-20).12 The law is a particularly 
invidious form of coerced masking, for it is "stamped with official approval by society's official 
representatives of reason", enabling lawmakers and judges to put on their own masks, convincing 
themselves that they are not personally responsible for the consequences of their decisions and deeds 
(Noonan 1976: 22-25). 
 
At some level of analysis, Noonan's mask metaphor seems to explain the persistence of residency 
requirements. If legislators can coin such innocuous words as "durational residency requirements" and 
structure welfare rules so it appears that the state gives aid and succour to the poor while in reality it 
provides them too little to live on, the reality of the face of the suffering person can be masked. The 
mask that legislators place over the face of the incoming poor may be the mask of a caricature they 
have seen on a TV cop show depicting big-city violence in LA or New York or Chicago, someone they 
do not want coming into their sleepy town or well-scrubbed suburb (itself masked as a land of Sheriff 
Andy Griffith and Aunt Bea, or Ozzie and Harriet). They may press onto the true faces of the poor, 
following urban legends, the mask of evil superhuman gang members or welfare cheats who amass a 
fortune bilking the government. Moreover, state officials, legislators and judges can put on their own 
masks, keeping up the appearance that they are not to blame for the plight of the suffering, for it is 'the 
law' that requires them to grant insufficient aid. Or perhaps, they might claim, making yet another mask, 
that their plight is the fault of the poor themselves, because they are too shiftless to work or too 
profligate to spend their allotments wisely, or because they have foolishly risked their families' security 
by coming to the new state for a dream of opportunity that does not await them. 
 
Noonan takes off only the first mask of injustice, however. His critique is most satisfying to modern 
philosophical or religious thought, for he leaves the oppressor with merely deontological reasons for 
removing his victim's mask: the oppressor should uncover the anguished face of the other because it is 
right or perhaps because God commands it. Yet, there is a deeper way to describe why oppression is 
as wrong for the oppressor as for the victim. As Levinas might claim, Noonan's critique is founded on 
ontology, not ethics. That is, Noonan is speaking to the lawmaker or judge as an ethical subject who 
continues to exercise his autonomous will against a passive object, the impoverished person, using his 
power as a separate self coercively to hide "the human face [of the other]... where emotion and 
affection are visible" (Noonan 1976: 19-20). He may hide himself as well, even hide himself to himself in 
the recesses of his conscience, so that he can justify to himself that he is acting for the best (Noonan 
1976: 21-22). Of course, the oppressed object, also a choosing self who exists prior to the ethical 
relation, may act in self-defence, masking himself protectively in disguises of power or in his roles, 
masking himself against his own psyche (Noonan 1976: 19-20). But, Levinas says, what starts as an 
either-or, the choice between totalizing the other into the same or into a means to the oppressor's end, 
or conversely being absorbed into the other, leads to the permanent possibility of war. 
The state of war suspends morality; it divests eternal institutions and obligations of their eternity and 
rescinds ad interim the unconditional imperatives... The act of foreseeing war and of winning it by every 
means -- politics -- is henceforth enjoined as the very exercise of reason. But violence does not consist 
so much in injuring and annihilating persons as in interrupting their continuity, making them play roles in 
which they no longer recognize themselves, making them betray not only commitments but their own 
substance, making them carry out actions that will destroy every possibility for action. Not only modern 
war, but every war employs arms that turn against those who wield them... War does not manifest... the 
other as other; it destroys the identity of the same (Levinas 1969: 21). 
 
In probing this horrifying, ongoing threat, Levinas takes off the second mask: the illusion that we, 
oppressors or victims, are choosing selves who exist prior to ethics, that we can and will either absorb 
the Other (as oppressors) or be absorbed (as victims). The mask he removes is the illusion that 
ontological freedom, "the identification of the same, not allowing itself to be alienated by the other", is 
true freedom rather than a philosophy of injustice (Levinas 1969: 45-46). For ontology pretends not to 
notice that, while I am drawn to that Face, desiring its absolute otherness in a way that my desire only 
deepens (Levinas 1969: 33-34), at the same time I am drawn to totalize the Face, to annihilate 
Otherness into the self-Same. Noonan's theory of the mask, of course, recognizes this instinct to 
totalize the Other into the Same. What his theory of the masks fails to acknowledge is that the Face of 
the Other refuses to be contained, it "cannot be comprehended, that is, encompassed", and "remains 
infinitely transcendent, infinitely foreign" (Levinas 1969: 194, 197). Indeed, I do not bend over the Face 
in my oppressive power, as Noonan's view of the masks of law would have it. Rather, as Levinas 
understands, it is the Face that towers over me; the dimension of height opened up displays "the alterity 
of the Other and of the Most High" (1969: 33-34). More significant than the moment when oppressors 
recognize that they totalize or mask the Other in the attempt to annihilate otherness is the moment that 
they concede that the Face towers over them in need. The moment we, the 'powerful', take off our own 
masks to see this, Levinas argues, we have "time to avoid and forestall the instant of inhumanity" 
(1969: 35), the moment of totalization of the Other. 
 
On Levinas's account, our ambivalence towards the other, exemplified in the exclusion of the 'vagabond 
beggar' of the fourteenth century and the welfare family of the twentieth, is a surprising riddle. If the 
stranger is most clearly the Other, why is it that we, who desire otherness, have refused to see what is 
clear -- the call of Face of the Other in her need and invitation -- and have refused to extend hospitality 
to the stranger through the welcome of language? Why would we, century after century, speak the 
words of diminishment to the stranger, the one who, after all, can make it possible for us to be who we 
are, in relationship to alterity; unique, and not annihilated into the other? 
 
 
Luther's Mask of God 
  
Levinas calls upon the Face-to-Face, the encounter with the Other, the Most High. Luther chides those 
who would seek the Most High: 
 
True Christian divinity... commandeth us not to search out the nature of God, but to know his will 
set out to us in Christ... There is nothing more dangerous than to wonder with curious 
speculations in heaven, and thereto search our God in his incomprehensible power, wisdom and 
majesty... If thou seek thus to comprehend God, and wouldest pacify him without Christ the 
mediator, making thy works a means between him and thyself, it cannot be but that thou must fall 
as Lucifer did, and in horrible despair lose God and all together. For as God is in his own nature 
unmeasurable, incomprehensible, and infinite, so is he to man's nature intolerable (Luther 1909: 
43). 
 
If Levinas is right that the welcome of the Face is what makes us at home, makes us who we are, then 
Luther's answer seems incomprehensible: to be face-to-face with the Most Other would seem to be the 
ethical moment par excellence, the moment for which we long and strive. 
 
But at least where God was concerned, Luther entertained a very different notion of the encounter than 
Levinas. In Luther's theology, God comes to us as hidden, as hiding His self. Brian Gerrish suggests 
the two 'strands' of this theology of hiddenness. Hiddenness is God hiding God's self in revelation, 
working in a "paradoxical mode" in which God's "wisdom is hidden under folly", God's "strength [is 
hidden] under abject weakness", his Self in the suffering of Christ (Gerrish 1973: 268). Hiddenness is 
lifegiving through death, salvation by judgment of damnation, extending righteousness to the 
unrighteous (Gerrish 1973: 268; Grislis 1967: 82). The second theological strand, on which I would 
focus, is Luther's reference, as suggested above, to God's hiddenness outside of God's revelation. This 
God is, among other things, a wrathful, terrifying, One: "ever an impersonal 'It' of sheer power and 
energy signified by such metaphors as abyss, chasm, chaos, even horror" (Tracy 1996: 10). This is the 
God who chooses to direct the will of some toward salvation and others toward damnation (Gerrish 
1973: 271-73). Indeed, even in faith, this hidden God is always waiting, dark and threatening, unable to 
be cabined even by God's own promise in Christ, unable to be understood, or even to be approached 
without dread. We approach only at the risk of annihilation (Forde 1992: 114, Tracy 1996: 9-10). 
 
As theologian Gerhard Forde explains, God is hidden, lying "in wait for us in our attempts to speak of 
him", and at the same time, God actively hides His self "and so will not be caught or used by us. God 
is... 'the absconder', the one who wills not to be seen by us in his 'naked majesty'" (Forde 1992: 114). 
 
In Luther's theology, every living thing is a mask of this hidden and awful God -- every person, every 
creature. Moreover, Forde claims, our speaking of God through figures of speech, describing him as, for 
instance, Father or King, is also masking: whether we speak the words given to us, the Our Fathers, or 
words that we create to name God, we are speaking the law back to ourselves -- in a demand that will 
tear us apart from Christ (Forde 1992: 114-115). To be sure, Luther in the 'Smalcald Articles' 
recognizes the law as "a promise and offer of grace and favour", the mask of an inviting God (Russell 
1995: 73, 133). But the words naming the Most High, conveying the law of the utterly Other, are not 
simply welcoming or hospitable or urging as in Levinas' face-to-face. As the utterly Other towers over 
us, it is also with a demanding wrath. This is not the God who is "just pure love, love, love and nothing 
but love" (Forde 1992: 115). We are found out in the end. Our shortcomings, our inabilities to answer 
the voice of the Other or apprehend His Face, kill us. And so, Forde argues, "it must be our project to 
get rid of such a God" (1992: 115). 
 
The poor stranger coming to our community similarly approaches us in our ambivalence. People are 
afraid of the stranger for good reason, for the stranger not only challenges every value and hope on 
which the community depends, but also presents himself as someone who is not known, not knowable. 
As a mask of God, the stranger approaches us in invitation and in wrath; we tremble to know whose 
invitation and whose wrath we encounter. 
 
The stranger is a particularly easy target in our confusion about whom we see, for unlike those needy 
people with whom we co-exist every day, the stranger comes with no history to help us know what we 
might expect from him, whether violence or invitation. We have not had the chance to totalize the 
stranger in the way we have with other needy people we pass by each day on the street, or see in the 
welfare office. And yet the fact that we select out the stranger for peculiar treatment in residency rules is 
our lie to ourselves, for those familiar to us mask themselves just as the stranger does; we simply have 
come to believe that we control the masks, as Noonan would have it, rather than understanding that the 
stranger has as much control over the masks as we. 
 
Because the mask of God is a metaphor, suggesting that what we see is both like and unlike God, we 
are never quite sure who and what it is we encounter when we encounter the stranger. We will almost 
certainly be encountering a mask of the stranger himself, and we fear what the mask conceals. The 
mask may be a winsome child's or a suffering old woman's, only to be revealed as a scam after we 
have let down our guard. If the mask compels compassion but the unmasked person is a deceiver, we 
face the threat of personal violence or of being foolish, the threat of having our lives and our goods 
taken away by force, or by fraud. And so our welfare programs concoct elaborate rules, including the 
residency requirement, to ensure that we are not made fools or victims, that cheaters do not take what 
we have worked for, or what we ourselves and truly desperate others need. Conversely, if the mask 
engenders the response of revulsion in us -- we encounter a dirty, sullen able-bodied man who seems 
unwilling to work to live. For example, we may deceive ourselves into turning our backs on the Face of 
the Other and find ourselves accused by his real need; we may be justly accused of masking his Face 
with the law, and refusing our own responsibility by masking ourselves in the law. Indeed, we may miss 
the welcome of the stranger under his mask, the response of the Face to our longing for alterity that 
Levinas so convincingly describes. To complicate matters further, we may find the stranger hiding from 
us, refusing to be caught or used by us: the parent who cannot admit that his children are starving 
because his pride will be demanded as payment for good; the child who pretends vulnerability to 
manipulate us, or toughness masking a broken life to avoid being labelled by us as pitiful; the woman 
who pretends naive complacency to avoid being beaten by us or others. 
 
At the same time, Christians as well as others must take seriously that if each person is a mask of God, 
the encounter with the Other is an encounter with the hidden God, though how much the encounter 
reveals about God is not only beyond our knowing but, as Luther suggests, it is beyond our asking. If 
we ask too many questions, if we pretend to understand too clearly what we are seeing of God when 
we encounter the Other, Luther tells us that we face the loss of God. For one thing, to pull off the mask 
is to look into a Face too mighty to be apprehended; as human creatures, we would be terrified to our 
eternal death. For another, to take off the mask is, as Forde says, to be accused of our shortcomings. 
Whether it is the need of God or of the Other ("the voice of God's weakness in the suffering of the 
oppressed of all history" Tracy 1996: 14) that we confront when we unmask the stranger -- a thing we 
do not know -- we are inescapably incapable of the compassion necessary to behold that Other. 
Scriptural encounters with God, theologian Edward Schroeder points out, were "not grace-events at all, 
to say nothing of concluding with any sort of 'happy end'. In such episodes God 'counts trespasses'... 
and no sinner facing God in such a transaction ever calls it grace" (Schroeder 1993: 28). We also face 
the reality that we are destined never to know when we face the unmasked Most High and when we 
simply face another mask; there may be masks "all the way down". To begin to believe that we have 
unmasked The Most High and we see God truly is to see a mirror mask: a mask which shows us back 
our own ugly face, our pretension to understand that One who actively escapes, absconds, from our 
understanding. Such a mirror mask is the firm conviction that our society can ensure fully just outcomes 
through the ways in which it provides for basic needs, by setting work rules and standard benefit levels 
and even residency requirements, when history tells us that evil and disorder triumph in the world, even 
in the bureaucratic world, that the goods of life are not distributed according to strict desert, that "the 
justice of God is hidden from us" (Gerrish 1973: 280-81). 
 
Finally, of course, there is the possibility that even in the apparently most threatening mask, we 
encounter the invitation of God, in preparation for God's work in saving us. Luther warned that only by 
clinging to the Redeemer can we have some assurance we are hearing the invitation of God; for in the 
Redeemer, God "has bound himself [to be gracious in] his Word and Sacraments", even though God 
continues to be hidden even in the Christ-revelation (Gerrish 1973: 266-268). But we cannot know that 
God has bound God's self to be gracious ONLY in Word and Sacraments; indeed, the creation raises 
the question, though it cannot answer it, whether God keeps God's self free for other encounters of 
grace, even among those who do not confess (Schroeder 1993: 28-29; Tracy 1996: 10). Thus, the 
encounter with the Other may -- just may -- be the invitation of God as well, albeit an invitation 
conveyed to us only indirectly through the apparently threatening stranger. If we mistake this invitation 
for a threat, we are undone. 
 
If the Other is a mask of God, portending perhaps both the stranger's impending violence and welcome, 
as well as possibly serving to convey, obliquely, both the wrath and the invitation of the Most High, then 
our ethical response to the Other becomes difficult. What seems impossible is to mask the stranger in 
the masks we know to be fictions of our own fears, the danger Noonan warns about. We cannot simply 
imagine everyone who comes into 'our' country or town or state, for instance, as bringing drugs, 
violence, laziness and disorder to our community, and thus actively discourage them with a blanket rule 
refusing them necessary aid. Such masks, as Noonan points out, are the worst form of self-justification, 
for they permit us to claim that we are not responsible for the Other in his need. Beyond this clearly 
unethical form of the mask, however, we face risk; for we cannot know which mask hides the 
threatening stranger and which the welcoming or needing one, which hides the wrath of God and which 
is God's invitation. At the least, some risk-taking in the administration of welfare is required, risk-taking 
that admits that the stranger is not a set of behaviours that can be cabined nor re-formed through law. 
Indeed, the stranger cannot be understood in "common sense" legal categories; what seems required is 
a regulatory scheme that recognizes the possibility that we are being welcomed by the other, not simply 
assuming that he is out to defeat or defraud us. Yet, to take risks of this kind throws us back on the 
deepest fears and longings we have as human beings, rather than helping us escape them. But the fear 
is preferable to mistaking the invitation, for who we are -- ethical persons -- is inescapably bound up in 
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1 42 U.S.C. s 604 (c) 1998. 
 
2 The original Social Security Act passed in 1934 permitted, but did not require, states to deny Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) benefits, and thus related benefits such as Medicaid, to 
those who had not been residents of the state for at least a year. This provision was designed to ensure 
that states concerned about burgeoning welfare populations would not unnecessarily restrict the influx 
of poor people. See Shapiro v. Thompson (1968), 394 U.S. 618, 634-40. 
 
3  Maldonado v Houstoun (3d Cir. 1998) 157 F.3d 179, 183. In most states, American welfare benefits 
also include food vouchers called Food Stamps based on income level and medical benefits, which are 
paid directly to providers for services provided. The Maldonados' qualified for $ 720 in Food Stamps as 
well as a one-time grant of $ 213 to defray job-search expenses but both were certified as temporarily 
unable to work so this amount was returned to the government. 
 
4 Roe v Anderson (E.D. Ca. 1997), 966 F. Supp. 977, aff'd 134 F. 3d 1400 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. 
granted, U.S., 119 S.Ct. 31 (1998). 
 
5 The United States Supreme Court has bolstered this trend by steady assaults on state laws that 
burden interstate movement, through the Commerce Clause, art. I, section 8, granting Congress the 
power to regulate interstate traffic, along with the so-called "dormant commerce clause", a principle of 
construction that state laws that burden interstate movement are unconstitutional even where Congress 
has not spoken. While United States v. Lopez (1995), 514 U.S. 549 broke sixty years of precedent 
upholding Congressional power to invalidate state laws that barely touched commerce, the Court's 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, along with that under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, Article 
IV, sec. 2, has been a juggernaut for erasing barriers to free movement. 
 
6 394 U.S. (1969) 618, 638. A central moral holding of Shapiro is that states may not constitutionally try 
to fence out indigents, the rule the Supreme Court first announced in Edwards v California (1941), 314 
U.S. 160, which made it criminal for people without means of support from entering California during the 
Great Depression. As the Court suggests, since states do not deter or penalize the non-poor who may 
also migrate to new states in search of better public services or more congenial communities, they may 
not punish or stop the poor who move from state to state for these same reasons. 
 
7 The federal statute enacting PRWORA gives ostensible permission for states to utilize a two-level 
benefit standard for newcomers, thus reinstituting a durational residency requirement, so long as the 
floor from the previous state is met and the two-level standard lasts for only one year. 42 U.S.C. s 
604(c). States reintroducing this requirement have argued that PRWORA has introduced a whole new 
welfare scheme to the U.S., in which welfare discretion and responsibility has "devolved" to the states 
rather than being highly regulated by the federal government and Congress, as in the past. Under this 
state-focussed scheme, Congress's permission is sufficient legal authorization for their rules. However, 
as most courts have noted, the argument that Congress gave approval to residency requirements was 
met by the Supreme Court in Shapiro with the declaration that "Congress cannot authorize the states to 
violate the [Constitution's] Equal Protection Clause" (Shapiro, 397 at 641). 
 
8 In England, for example, the first statute to regulate the provision of poor relief, in 1531, provided that 
the new class of wandering poor, the "beggars and vagabonds," created by dislocation of tenant 
farmers and the disappearance of medieval occupations, should be sought out, and any person 
begging who was not aged or "impotent" should be imprisoned (Quigley 1996: 92-93). Similarly, when 
Lyons, France experienced an influx of "beggars and vagrants" due to the dislocation of agricultural 
workers to the city and attendant fears of disorder, city fathers established a charitable administration 
that provided relief tickets for local poor, and gave foreigners a night's lodging before they were sent 
away (Riven & Cloward 1971: 9-11). Spain similarly instituted poor laws in 1534 prohibiting the 
"undeserving" poor from begging and providing that they should be sent to "houses of charity" (Backer 
1997: 44-45). 
 
9 Whilst such an argument may have some plausibility with respect to international immigration, it has 
almost none for interstate migration: the number of destitute people moving from state to state is too 
small, and their behaviours too hard to distinguish from those of local residents. Moreover, some states 
that have instituted these rules are sitting on unprecedented economic wealth. For instance, the state of 
Minnesota, which has twice attempted to implement this rule since 1994, only to be prevented by the 
courts, has had a $ 6 billion budget surplus projection during the last four years. A second explanation 
some people will give but no one can prove is racial: the underground word in at least state where 
whites are in a large majority is that the requirements will keep minorities from more violent 
communities from bringing their problems to the "safer" state. 
 
10 In this view, residency requirements would be a natural social parallel to federal devolution: as 
citizens have become increasingly disillusioned with the ineffectiveness and waste of large federal 
programs, devolution encourage people to naturally start identifying with their local communities instead 
of their federal neighbours. 
 
11 See also Backer 1997: 31 (describing the Spanish monk Fra Domingo de Soto's argument "the 
natural law of hospitality is best exercised on the poor beggars of another land, and the spiritual 
rewards for giving to them shall surely be all the greater"). 
 
12 Noonan distinguished this use of mask from the notion of disguise by which one conceals one's 
inner psyche from the world on a daily basis, not putting the person's humanity aside, or roles, which all 
of us necessarily play as a way to work in the world in security and with ease of performance. 
